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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three chapters that examine how regulation by a central
authority motivates changes in behavior.
Chapter 1 identifies the role of a tolerance policy as a manager’s regulatory
mechanism which can deter worker misconduct in rank-order tournaments. When
contestants’ actions cannot be perfectly monitored or doing so is prohibitively costly,
misconduct takes place. This chapter develops a theoretical model in which contestants
compete for a prize in a symmetric tournament and in which the organizer tolerates some
level of misconduct. In addition to showing that zero tolerance does not minimize
equilibrium misconduct, it also shows there exists a range of tolerance levels where a
symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium exists in which players engage in malfeasance (i.e.
misconduct above the tolerated level) with some probability.
Chapters 2 and 3 study how a patentholder’s decision to license a clean technology
to firms differs under alternative regulatory instruments (either an emissions tax or
tradable permits). They are the first theoretical analyses to explicitly account for
oligopolistic behavior in the product market and to endogenize the patentholder’s optimal
licensing decision under environmental policy.
Chapter 2 assumes that the number of firms in the oligopoly is fixed. In contrast to
what is generally found in the environmental literature, the results show that, for at least
some range of innovation, a permit policy motivates the patentholder to license to more
firms than he would under an equivalent emissions tax. This is because, for this range of
innovation, the optimal licensing policy of the innovator is to auction a sufficiently large
vi

number of licenses so that the market becomes concentrated. For an equivalent tax and
permit policy, it is more ‘difficult’ to concentrate the market under the latter since nonlicensees can free-ride off of the reduction in permit price that occurs when more licenses
are auctioned.
Chapter 3 is a natural extension of Chapter 2 by allowing free entry of non-licensees.
The results are analogous to those in the previous chapter although the intuition differs.
In Chapter 3, the innovator auctions enough licenses in order to deter entry by a
potentially limitless number of non-licensees.
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CHAPTER 1: MINIMIZING MISCONDUCT IN TOURNAMENTS
BY TOLERATING IT

1.1 Introduction
Competition can foster misconduct in any circumstance where the organizer of a
contest cannot perfectly monitor contestants’ actions or when doing so is prohibitively
costly. Cheating or doping in contests has received much recent study (Berentsen, 2002;
Krakel, 2007; Stowe & Gilpatric, 2010; Gilpatric, 2011). From doping in sports to fraud
by sales staff competing for promotion, there are actions that competitors can take which
improve performance and make winning more likely, but which are contrary to the
interest of the organizer and are therefore prohibited.1 But should an organizer prohibit all
behavior he does not want contestants to engage in? Does doing so minimize the extent
of misconduct that will in fact take place when enforcement is imperfect?
Consider a firm that motivates its sales staff through competition. These staff may use
varying degrees of aggressiveness in their sales tactics to pressure customers into making
a purchase, ranging from standard “hard sell” practices to sales fraud, and at least beyond
some point the benefits to the firm of making a sale may be outweighed by reputational
and other costs to the firm. That is, at some point (and beyond), such behavior is deemed

1

Examples of general misconduct include scientists and academics misrepresenting research to attain
grants (Sovacool, 2006), firms falsifying documents to obtain patents first, and teachers inflating student
achievement test scores to ensure funding (Jacob & Levitt, 2003). The current paper addresses those
instances in which misconduct is generally tolerated by the organizers of the tournament.

1

undesirable by the firm.2 But the individual may nevertheless be motivated to use such
sales tactics if doing so is sufficiently likely to be the margin of victory that earns a bonus
or promotion. Such behavior that improves a contestant’s performance but is undesirable
for the organizer I term “misconduct”.
In this paper I determine the equilibrium level of misconduct chosen by players in a
symmetric rank-order tournament between two competitors in which the organizer
tolerates some level of misconduct. I assume that misconduct exists on a continuum, with
different levels representing a variety of actions which are deemed undesirable by the
tournament organizer.3 Higher levels of misconduct yield greater performance
improvement, but also a higher probability of being detected.
In this context, I show that although all misconduct is (by construction) undesirable
from the organizer’s perspective, this does not imply it is best to prohibit all such
behavior and punish it (when detected) with disqualification in a contest. In fact,
tolerating some level of misconduct, so only behavior beyond some point constitutes
“malfeasance” or “cheating” which brings with it the punishment of disqualification, may
reduce misconduct in competition. My central finding is that it is not optimal to prohibit
behavior that cannot effectively be deterred under the enforcement mechanism (i.e.,
undesirable actions which competitors will engage in despite their being prohibited). In
particular, the ‘line’ that defines when misconduct ought to be prohibited is best drawn

2

One can think of worker behavior being on a continuum and that there exists some point on this
continuum past which the employer deems behavior to be undesirable (i.e., the worker ‘crosses a line’).
This point (and above it) is considered misconduct by the employer. I do not model when (and why) an
employer believes such behavior constitutes misconduct.
3
I do not model a single, undesirable action that increases in severity along the continuum. Rather, the
continuum represents an assortment of undesirable actions (e.g., pressuring customers versus sales fraud).
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not where behavior is deemed undesirable (i.e., should not be drawn at zero) but rather
where it is no longer worthwhile for the contestant to cross it, given what is tolerated.
My finding that tolerating some degree of misconduct may reduce the extent that it
occurs in competition is analogous to findings regarding “marginal deterrence” in the
enforcement literature that began with the work of Becker (1968). This rational
deterrence framework assumes that the choice to engage in misconduct is a matter of
weighing the potential benefits against the potential costs. However, for my case in which
misconduct is not a dichotomous choice to do so or not but rather a matter of degree, the
principal of marginal deterrence, as first discussed by Stigler (1970), pertains. Shavell
(1992) describes marginal deterrence as the tendency of an individual to be deterred from
committing a severely harmful act due to the difference, or margin, between the expected
sanction for it and a less harmful act. Mookherjee and Png (1994) develop a general
enforcement model in which potential violators choose from a continuum of acts of
increasing severity. They find that the optimal penalty increases with an act’s severity,
but that optimal marginal penalties are always less than marginal harm. Further, they
show that it may be optimal to apply no punishment to acts of a severity below some
point in order to more effectively deter more serious acts. That is, some harmful acts are
best tolerated.
Unlike the standard decision-making environments of rational enforcement models, a
competition is a strategic environment in which the degree of misconduct is determined
by contestants best-responding to the expected misconduct of competitors. This is an
important difference between my model and prior work on marginal deterrence. Another
critical feature of a tournament is that the primary punishment is likely to be
3

disqualification, which lends to an inherently dichotomous enforcement outcome and
thus limits the possibility of marginal sanctions for increasing degrees of misconduct. In
my tournament setting, if the level of tolerance is sufficiently high, the expected payoff
from choosing the tolerated level of misconduct is greater than the expected payoff from
engaging in the higher level of misconduct that arises under a “zero tolerance”
enforcement policy. That is, for some tolerated level below the level of misconduct that
would arise if any detected misconduct precipitates disqualification, the equilibrium of
the game is for competitors to engage in only tolerated behavior and not exhibit
malfeasance.
In addition to showing that zero tolerance does not minimize the level of misconduct
in equilibrium, I show that as the tolerated level increases there exists a range where the
symmetric equilibrium is in mixed strategies. Players choose to commit malfeasance with
some probability. As the tolerated level increases on this range the probability of
malfeasance declines, as does the expected level of misconduct, although the level of
misconduct that players engage in when they do commit malfeasance increases with the
tolerated level.
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section reviews the literature on
cheating in tournaments and my contribution in this context. Section 1.3 presents the
theoretical model. The equilibria are established in Section 1.4 and an analytical
comparison between zero tolerance and a leniency policy is examined in Section 1.5.
Section 1.6 concludes with a discussion of the results, limitations of the model, and
proposed extensions.

4

1.2 Literature Review
Cheating in contests has generally been modeled in the context of tournament theory
which originated with the seminal work of Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Nalebuff and
Stiglitz (1983). The models discussed here assume all misconduct is prohibited and
therefore treat any chosen level of misconduct as ‘cheating’ or malfeasance.4 As in all
tournament models, contestants compete with one another for a fixed, pre-specified prize
and the contestant with the highest relative output wins (i.e., he who ranks first wins).
Generally, output is subject to randomness and is increased by a player’s choice of work
effort and misconduct. To deter misconduct, the organizer of the tournament institutes an
(imperfect) enforcement policy which includes an audit (i.e., inspection) probability and a
detection technology. The detection technology represents the probability that a
contestant is caught engaging in misconduct, if audited. If caught, the contestant is
immediately disqualified from the tournament (aka ‘zero-tolerance’).
The literature examining cheating in tournaments has often focused on minimum
enforcement costs or minimum audit probabilities necessary to induce the no-cheating
equilibrium.5 Assuming two symmetric players that each chooses effort and whether to
cheat or not (i.e., a dichotomous choice), Curry and Mongrain (2009) differentiate
between the enforcement policy (audit probability, detection technology, and the outside
sanction) and the prize structure (limited liability, win by default, and the prize spread)
and ask if changes in the prize spread can act as a deterrent to misconduct. They argue

4

This is in contrast to the model I propose in which malfeasance occurs only when a contestant engages in
misconduct above the tolerated level.
5
All models discussed here assume two risk-neutral players that compete strategically by simultaneously
choosing work and/or cheating, unless otherwise noted.

5

that in most tournament settings, limited liability exists such that the sanction, if caught
cheating, is no more than the value of the prize awarded. Consequently, changes in the
prize structure are analogous to changes in the expected penalty. The authors conclude
that increases in the value of the first- and second-place prize, without changing the prize
spread, decreases the minimum audit probability required to deter cheating. The proposed
rationale is that without a change in the prize spread there is no effect on effort, but a
change in the first-place prize increases the expected penalty of cheating. They also find
that although winning by default reduces equilibrium effort, it also reduces minimum
monitoring costs.
In contrast, Berentsen (2002) allows asymmetry between two players that compete in
a sporting contest. Each contestant decides whether or not to take a performanceenhancing drug before the event. He finds that in the mixed strategy equilibrium, the
favorite has a higher incentive to cheat. The main focus of the model is on a rankingbased sanction scheme whereby the penalty, if caught, is based on a player’s ranking. He
finds that such a scheme can induce the no-cheating equilibrium at lower enforcement
costs. He also shows that if contestants are symmetric, then the decision to cheat or not is
analogous to the Prisoner Dilemma’s game whereby it would always be in the players’
best interests to coordinate and not cheat. Yet, the potential increase in payoff from
deviated to cheating results in both players choosing cheating in equilibrium and each
receiving lower payoffs.
Similarly, Krakel (2007) also models two asymmetric players that compete by
choosing output and a binary choice of cheating or not. Both effort and cheating are
complements in production and incur direct costs; while getting caught cheating incurs
6

additional indirect ‘reputation’ costs. He finds that whether or not a player decides to
cheat depends on the interaction of three effects. The first, the likelihood effect,
represents the increase in the probability of winning when the opponent does not cheat
and has a positive effect on cheating incentives. The second, the cost effect, and the third
effect, the base-salary effect, place downward pressure on the incentive to cheat. The cost
effect is the increase in costs from cheating while the base-salary effect is the reduction in
the base salary if caught cheating. Krakel shows that the larger is the degree of
asymmetry or the error term, the more likely no cheating occurs in equilibrium. In terms
of the asymmetry, he finds that when both players either cheat or both do no cheat, the
favorite will always choose higher equilibrium levels of effort; and that ex-ante testing
relative to ex-post testing always leads to larger equilibrium effort.
Likewise Stowe and Gilpatric (2010) model two asymmetric players (a ‘leader’ and a
‘trailer’) that simultaneously choose whether to cheat. They find that the leader has a
higher (lower) incentive to cheat for sufficiently low (high) audit probabilities. Further,
they also discover that correlated audits (either both players are audited or both are not)
decrease the incidence of cheating in the mixed strategy relative to uncorrelated audits.
This is because, if both players cheat and are audited under correlated audits, then both
are disqualified. Under uncorrelated audits, if both players cheat, an opponent may be the
only one audited. Therefore, the expected payoff to cheating under correlated audits is
smaller. The authors also find that if the tournament organizer can employ differential
auditing (each player is audited with their own probability), then the no-cheating
equilibrium is induced at a lower cost.

7

Rather than modeling the choice of misconduct as dichotomous, Gilpatric (2011)
allows misconduct to lie on a continuum. He models

symmetric players that choose

misconduct and work effort, and explores how changes in the parameters of the
tournament alter equilibrium cheating and effort. He includes a detection technology in
which the probability of being caught if audited is increasing in the degree of misconduct.
This is the general framework I will employ as well. Interestingly, he finds that although
higher monitoring reduces cheating, it can also lead to reductions in effort. Similar to
Stowe and Gilpatric (2010), correlated audits deter cheating more than uncorrelated
audits. Further, allowing a runner-up to win by default also reduces the incentive to cheat.
In contrast to the above models, I allow another aspect of tournaments – tolerance of
low levels of misconduct – to be included in the model, and show that it can act as a
better deterrent to misconduct than zero-tolerance under imperfect enforcement. I believe
that including tolerance is an important step toward understanding a contestant’s choice
between misconduct and malfeasance and in understanding the behavior of tournament
organizers.6 Although there are a variety of reasons that contest organizers may tolerate
some minor levels of misconduct (e.g., punishment is costly or agents may be given
“benefit of the doubt” when evidence is weak), I find that they may do this because it
motivates contestants to choose the relatively low level of tolerated behavior instead of a
higher level of misconduct that would be chosen under zero tolerance. The idea that
managers can reduce misconduct by partially tolerating it is perhaps counterintuitive, but
my model demonstrates why this is the case.

6

For example, my model provides intuition as to why managers may explicitly allow their employees to
engage in less severe levels of misconduct without penalizing them.

8

1.3 Model of Cheating
I set up a tournament model in the spirit of Lazear and Rosen (1981) in which two
identical risk-neutral contestants,

compete in a contest to win a pre-specified

prize by choosing some level of misconduct. Higher levels of misconduct lead to an
increased probability of winning but also higher probabilities of disqualification. Given
that my focus is on misconduct, I abstract from the choice of work effort since
equilibrium misconduct is independent of equilibrium work effort (Gilpatric, 2011).7 The
tournament organizer tolerates minor levels of misconduct so that a contestant is
disqualified if observed misconduct is higher than what is allowable. Misconduct in
excess of the tolerated level is considered cheating or malfeasance. Therefore, although
higher levels of misconduct lead to increases in the probability of ranking first, observed
malfeasance is met with disqualification. The discrete change in the probability of
disqualification from choosing malfeasance over the tolerated level drives equilibrium
behavior and allows me to identify the level of tolerance which invokes the minimum
equilibrium level of misconduct.
The timing of the game is as follows. First, the tournament organizer announces the
payoffs and the tolerated level of behavior. Second, contestants choose a level of
misconduct taking into account their beliefs about what their opponents will choose. In
this stage, output and rankings are realized. In the final stage, the tournament organizer
(or an outside regulatory body) audits players with some fixed probability and may detect
cheating, where a cheating player is met with disqualification. I define the organizer’s

7

However, effort is not independent of misconduct. In particular, equilibrium effort is a function of the
equilibrium probability of being caught (Gilpatric, 2011).

9

enforcement policy as one that consists of an audit probability, the detection technology,
and disqualification as the form of punishment.
Formally, consider misconduct as lying on a continuum,

, representing a

continuum of undesirable actions of increasing severity (not an increasing level of a
single activity). To deter misconduct, the tournament organizer chooses a tolerated level,
. Note that the tolerated level may possibly be zero. The organizer also sets the
payoffs, with the winner of the contest receiving
. The prize spread is then

while the loser receives

.

Then, each contestant chooses some level of misconduct,
output,

. Output also depends on randomness,
and let

with

be the cumulative distribution of

, which increases
.8 Define

, where

with corresponding pdf

Then, the probability that player has a higher output than player

is

. Note

that a higher output does not necessarily translate into “winning” the contest due to
possible disqualification.
Once output is observed, the tournament organizer, or an outside regulatory body,
audits players with a fixed probability,

under a correlated audit scheme. Correlated

audits mean that either both players are audited or both are not. This is in contrast to
uncorrelated audits in which each player is audited with independent probabilities.
Gilpatric and Stowe (2010) and Gilpatric (2011) compare equilibrium cheating levels

8

I assume randomness in output is observed after misconduct is chosen.

10

.

chosen under correlated vs. uncorrelated audits and find that correlated audits are more
effective at deterring cheating when full deterrence is not possible.9
When an audit occurs, the probability that a player is caught engaging in misconduct,
is nonnegative and increasing in
10

If

;

and

, he is not punished. On the other hand, if

, he is

disqualified, with the first place winnings automatically going to the other player if the
other player is not also disqualified. Therefore, the probability of being disqualified given
that an audit has occurred is represented by the following piecewise function:

Note that I do not assume that an audit fully reveals the actions of the contestants. Rather,
an audit has some probability of discovering some prohibited action engaged in by a
contestant. Obviously, there is no reason for an auditor to search for evidence of actions
which are permissible. The increasing

functions reflects the assumption that actions of

greater severity (and correspondingly greater impact on output) are more easily
detectable. Thus, the assumption that
while

yields zero probability of disqualification

yields strictly positive probability of detection does not imply that the audit

9

In a recent paper by Curry and Mongrain (2009), the authors allow the audit probability of the winner to
be higher than the audit probability of the loser. They find that this decreases the incentive to cheat and
therefore the minimum monitoring costs required to deter cheating decreases. Such an audit probability
applied to the present model would produce analogous results and would not alter the main results found
here.
10

To ensure an interior solution with equilibrium misconduct greater than zero I assume that
.

11

probability can fully reveal the level or extent of a single activity, but rather reflects the
fact that values of

above are different actions than those below .

Note also that in this model the only punishment is disqualification. I disregard the
possibility of an outside sanction which some of the existing literature has considered.
The exclusion of an outside sanction simplifies the analysis and allows me to fully
capture what I view as an important characteristic of tournaments– that disqualification is
the central form of punishment and outside sanctions are limited.11 This constrains the
ability of the organizer to achieve marginal deterrence.

1.4 Equilibrium
Players simultaneously choose

to maximize expected payoffs. Since

equilibrium misconduct will always be greater than zero, even when

,
. Note that it is

never optimal for a contestant to choose misconduct below the tolerated level since, for
any

, the marginal benefit of

expected payoffs be

is positive while the marginal cost is zero. Let

for each player in each case, :

(1) If both players engage in malfeasance, then

[1.1]

11

Although contestants that are caught cheating may incur costs that are outside the scope of the
tournament (e.g., reputation costs), I abstract from such penalties. My focus is on those penalties that are
under the control of the tournament organizer.

12

Player ’s expected payoff is symmetric. Equation [1.1] is analogous to the expected
payoff in Gilpatric (2011), where the first component represents player ’s payoff when
both contestants are audited but neither are caught and go head to head; and the second is
the payoff when player wins by default. The third component represents the payoff
from going head to head because no audit has occurred.
(2) For the asymmetric case, without loss of generality, assume cheats and

does

not, then

[1.2]

[1.3]

The main difference between [1.2] and [1.1] is that there is no chance for to win by
default. In this case, when

does not cheat, he may still compete on output if his

opponent is not caught although the probability of ranking first is less than one-half. On
the other hand, he may win by default.
(3) If both players choose the tolerated level, then

[1.4]

Player ’s expected payoff is identical. When both players choose the tolerated level, the
winner is determined by whichever realizes a higher error, .
13

For cases one and two, the optimal level of misconduct is determined by using the
Nash Equilibrium (NE) solution concept. If player believes

is going to cheat with

probability one, and if player responds by cheating, then anticipates receiving the
expected payoff in equation [1.1]. Player
symmetric NE level of misconduct,

follows a similar strategy, so that the

, is determined by the first-order conditions of

equation [1.1] and by imposing symmetry:

[1.5]

That is,

is the unique pure strategy symmetric equilibrium, given that both

players engage in malfeasance. Corresponding equilibrium profits are
. Likewise, without loss of generality, if player believes

is going to

choose the tolerated level with probability one, then player ’s best response is
determined by the first-order condition of equation [1.2]:

[1.6]

14

Equation [1.6] implicitly defines
the cheating player,

which is the optimal level of misconduct chosen by

given that he believes his opponent chooses with probability

one.12 Finally, if both players choose the tolerated level, each earns
Although the strategy space of each player is

.

, I distinguish equilibria as

dependent on the level of tolerance. This idea is represented in a reduced manner as a
payoff matrix in Table 1.13 The first (second) element in each cell is player ’s ( ’s)
expected payoff in each case, accounting for the NE level of misconduct when
applicable.14 Therefore, the cell in the upper left corner represents expected payoffs when
both players choose

while the cell in the lower right corresponds to the expected

payoffs when both players correctly believe the other will cheat with probability one,
and are therefore best responding to these beliefs (i.e., choose the NE level

).The

remaining two cells represent the expected payoffs in the asymmetric cases in which, if a
player engages in malfeasance and has beliefs that his opponent is choosing the tolerated
level, then he best responds by choosing
the case for which player believes
earns

while

earns

. So, for example, the cell in the lower right is

will choose the tolerated level so then
.

12

It is not necessarily true that a pure strategy asymmetric equilibrium exists in this range. Nonetheless, I
solve for because it provides insight on how the equilibrium level of misconduct chosen in the
symmetric mixing strategy changes.
13
Note that for some of the cells, a continuous choice problem is occurring where players are choosing
misconduct from a continuum, given that their opponent is cheating (i.e., southeast cell) or given that their
opponent is choosing the tolerated level (i.e., northeast and southwest cells). This table merely represents,
in a reduced form, the dichotomous choice between malfeasance or not.
14
For example, the upper left cell does not represent NE but rather what each player would earn if they
both choose the tolerated level.

15

Table 1: Expected Payoffs

Player
Optimal
Malfeasance
Player
Optimal Malfeasance

I further characterize the equilibrium as a function of the tolerated level, for a given
enforcement policy. For sufficiently high levels of tolerance, it is a dominant strategy for
each player to choose the tolerated level, so that
perspective, this requires that, given player

is the equilibrium. From player ’s

chooses the tolerated level, the expected

payoff from choosing the tolerated level is larger than the expected payoff from engaging
in malfeasance at

,

, which can be simplified as

[1.7]

The same is true for player

When [1.7] holds with equality, , the minimum tolerated

level required to induce the symmetric tolerance equilibrium,
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, is implicitly defined.

Likewise, both players will choose

for sufficiently low levels of tolerance. For

to be the equilibrium requires that the expected payoff from choosing
than the expected payoff from choosing

,

is larger

. This reduces to

[1.8]

When [1.8] holds with equality, is implicitly defined. This defines the maximum level
of tolerance for which symmetric malfeasance,

is the equilibrium.

For those levels of tolerance that lie between and , there exists a symmetric mixing
strategy where each player engages in malfeasance with probability

and chooses

he engages in malfeasance where

is the level of misconduct that maximizes the

expected payoff from malfeasance,

.

if

Formally, the equilibrium mixing strategy chosen by each player leaves his opponent
indifferent between choosing the tolerated level and choosing to engage in a unique level
of malfeasance. 15 To see this, consider a mixing strategy of a player as one that
randomizes over two actions - to choose the tolerated level or to engage in some level of
malfeasance. Without loss of generality, player chooses a probability of engaging in
malfeasance,

that leaves his opponent indifferent between choosing the tolerated level

and engaging in malfeasance,

15

That is, if a player cheats, there is not a range of malfeasance for which the player is indifferent between
any value in it and the tolerated level. The only indifference exists for some unique level of malfeasance,
which I define as
Thus, the equilibrium mixing strategy represents the probability distribution of
engaging in malfeasance or not, over the tolerated level and a unique level of malfeasance.
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The term on the left-hand side of the equality are the expected payoffs accruing to

from

malfeasance while the right-hand side of the equality are the expected payoffs from
choosing the tolerated level. Solving for

yields the probability that will engage in

malfeasance for a range of misconduct levels,

,

Then, note that for any belief about what an opponent will do, there exists a unique
level of malfeasance that is a best-response for each player. Thus, again without loss of
generality, if player believes

will engage in malfeasance with probability

, then

player , if he also chooses to engage in malfeasance, will solve the following
maximization problem,

which yields first-order conditions with solution

:

Imposing symmetry amongst the players and simultaneously solving yields a unique
symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium,

:
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[1.9]

and
[1.10]

where, again,

and

represent the equilibrium probability of malfeasance and the

level of malfeasance chosen by a player if he does engage in malfeasance, respectively.
In this case, the expected profits from the mixed strategy are comprised of that
portion due to both players cheating,

one player cheating and the other

not,

and from both players choosing

the tolerated level,

:

[1.11]

Proposition 1 summarizes the symmetric equilibrium play as a function of the tolerated
level.
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Proposition 1.1: For a given enforcement policy, when

, both players

engage in malfeasance with probability one and each optimally chooses

. When

, both players do not engage in malfeasance and choose the tolerated level,
. For those values of tolerance that lie between the two calculated thresholds,
, each player engages in malfeasance with probability

and chooses

if they do engage in malfeasance. [See Appendix A for all proofs].

It is intuitive that different regions of tolerance lead to alternative equilibria. When
the tolerated level is too low,

, both players find it in their best interest to engage in

malfeasance with probability one and choose

. Interestingly, when

, the decision

to engage in malfeasance or not is parallel to the prisoner’s dilemma game. To see this,
reconsider Table 1 which illustrates the different payoffs. If it were possible, it would
always be better for both players to coordinate and choose the tolerated level, as these
profits are always greater than when both players cheat (i.e.,
On the other extreme, sufficiently high levels of tolerance,

).
, induce players to

choose the level of misconduct, . That is, tolerating a sufficient level of misconduct
reduces the gain from malfeasance enough to allow players to coordinate on nonmalfeasance.
When,

it is not either player’s best response to engage in malfeasance with

probability one or choose the tolerated level with probability one. Therefore, each player
randomizes over choosing to engage in either a unique level of malfeasance

or

choosing the tolerated level. Figure 1 is a graphical representation of Proposition 1.
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0

Figure 1: Symmetric Equilibria as a Function of the Tolerated Level

1.5 The Effect of Tolerance on Equilibrium Misconduct
I have shown that as the level of tolerance increases, the expected payoff from
malfeasance falls such that players are more likely to choose the tolerated level rather
than engage in malfeasance. Consequently, for sufficiently high levels of tolerance, both
players will optimally choose the tolerated level.

Proposition 1.2: For any enforcement policy, there exists a level of tolerance, ,
that is less than the level of misconduct that would be chosen under zero
tolerance,

, such that is the equilibrium.

Consider the case under zero tolerance so that each contestant chooses
tolerated level slightly below

. Setting the

means that a player can, by choosing the tolerated level,

experience a discrete drop in the probability of disqualification at the expense of a very
insignificant fall in the probability of ranking first, even when his opponent best responds
by engaging in malfeasance. This is an example of the principal of marginal deterrence.
Namely, a contestant is deterred from engaging in
21

as the tolerated level rises to a

sufficient degree because the penalty associated with engaging in malfeasance (i.e.,
disqualification) is larger than the penalty associated with choosing the tolerated level
(i.e., zero penalty).
With each region of tolerance that supports the various equilibria, I can calculate how
the tolerated level changes the expected level of equilibrium misconduct,

where

For those tolerated levels that support the pure strategy cheating equilibrium,
increases in the tolerated level have no effect on the expected level of equilibrium
misconduct. This is because, in this region, the tolerated level does not factor into the
choice of a player’s equilibrium misconduct. In other words, in this region, players
engage in malfeasance with probability one, and the tolerated level plays no role.
Naturally, for those levels of tolerance that support the pure strategy no cheating
equilibrium,

chosen misconduct rises with the tolerated level.

Determining the effect of increasing the tolerated level on the mixing strategy is more
complex. For those tolerated levels that support the mixed strategy equilibrium,
, the tolerated level not only affects the probability of malfeasance but also the level
of misconduct, if cheating does occur:
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Lemma 1.1: Within the region of tolerated levels that support the mixed strategy
equilibrium,

, the probability of malfeasance falls as increases ,

If

the level of misconduct chosen if malfeasance occurs rises

with ,

If

the level of malfeasance chosen if cheating occurs

falls as increases ,

As the tolerated level rises, the likelihood of either player engaging in malfeasance
always falls,

Recall that a player chooses

to leave his opponent indifferent

between engaging in malfeasance and not. When the tolerated level rises, the opponent’s
expected payoff from choosing the tolerated level rises. To ensure the opponent’s
indifference between choosing malfeasance and the tolerated level, a player must lower
his probability of engaging in malfeasance.
From the first-order conditions in equations [1.8] and [1.9] that define
respectively, it is apparent that
or
and

and

,

lies between them, although determining whether

requires specifying functional forms. The import of the ranking of

becomes apparent when considering the effect of the tolerated level on the level of

misconduct chosen,

. That is, whether or not equilibrium misconduct falls or rises

depends on the relative ranking of

and

. To see this, consider the perspective of

player . As the tolerated level rises, the likelihood that his opponent is going to cheat
falls,

Consequently, as

becomes smaller and approaches zero, it implies that

, if he decides to cheat, is choosing a level of misconduct that approaches
23

. This is

because, as stated earlier,

is determined by a weighted average of the first-order

conditions that determine

and

. Therefore, if

increases in the tolerated level,

and subsequent decreases in the probability of malfeasance, imply that
. On the other hand, if

rises towards

, increases in the tolerated level, and subsequent

decreases in the probability of malfeasance, imply that

falls towards

.

Because of this ambiguity regarding the effect of the tolerated level on
unable to obtain an analytical solution to

for

numerical simulations and find that

, I am

. Therefore, I rely on
falls.16 That is, as the tolerated

even if

level rises in the region that supports the mixing strategy, the fall in the probability of
malfeasance is sufficiently large enough to outweigh any change in the level of
equilibrium malfeasance chosen given that a player decides to cheat. That is, the expected
level of equilibrium misconduct falls.
In particular, I specify that (i) the error term is uniformly distributed,
(ii) the range of possible misconduct lies between zero and one,
probability detection function is quadratic,

16

In general, I find that

, and (iii) the

. Figure 2 compares the expected

value of equilibrium misconduct for a low audit probability case
probability case

,

versus a high

.17

implying that

fall in the probability of malfeasance,

. That

even when

means that the

is sufficiently large enough to outweigh the increase in the level

of equilibrium misconduct chosen, if a player decides to cheat,
.
17
Similar graphs are produced for
, and
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Figure 2: Equilibrium Misconduct for a Uniform Distribution

Figure 2 shows that the expected level of misconduct is falling in the region that
supports the mixed strategy. It also shows that the level of tolerance that minimizes
expected equilibrium misconduct is greater than zero and is significantly below
is, consider the

. That

case, which is represented by the solid line. The third vertical

dotted line moving from the origin and along the horizontal axis is the calculated
tolerance threshold,

and the fourth dotted line is

. As moves

from the origin and approaches , the expected payoff from choosing the tolerated level
begins to rise relative to the expected payoff from choosing malfeasance, given that the
opponent is engaging in malfeasance. At , a player is indifferent between the two. As
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increases beyond , a player decreases the probability of engaging in malfeasance in
order to keep his opponent indifferent between engaging in malfeasance and not. The
simulations indicate that as the level of tolerance rises in this region, the probability of
malfeasance drops significantly enough that the expected value of misconduct falls (even
when the level of misconduct chosen, if a player cheats, rises). Finally, as approaches
the probability of engaging in malfeasance falls to zero, and both players choose the
tolerated level.
Proposition 1.2 is also illustrated. Under zero tolerance the level of misconduct is
, but the organizer can minimize misconduct by setting the tolerated level
at

. In fact, this shows that the organizer can induce a significant fall in

misconduct by tolerating it at level . A similar story can be told for the high probability
case,

.

1.6 Conclusion
When enforcement is imperfect, competition motivates contestants to engage in
misconduct. This is particularly true in rank-order tournaments because small increases in
output can lead to significant increases in the probability of ranking first. Although
misconduct is undesirable from the tournament organizer’s perspective, it is quite
possible that it is best to punish only contestants that engage in sufficiently high levels of
misconduct. That is, it may be in the best interest of the tournament organizer to tolerate
misconduct up to some level, but punish contestants for any sufficiently high observed
misconduct. The intuition follows from the principal of marginal deterrence which
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indicates that a contestant’s incentive to engage in severely harmful acts is reduced if the
expected sanction is for a less harmful act is reduced or eliminated.
In regards to my model, any level of misconduct that is at or below the tolerated level
has an expected penalty of zero (i.e., no possibility of disqualification). In contrast, any
level of misconduct above that which is tolerated is met with a discrete increase in the
possibility of disqualification, motivating contestants to choose the tolerated level. I also
determined that there is a range of tolerated levels that result in a symmetric mixed
strategy equilibrium where each player chooses to engage in malfeasance with some
probability. In this range, as the level of tolerance rises, the probability of malfeasance
falls, although, if players do cheat, they choose higher levels of misconduct. Numerical
simulations provide evidence that as the tolerated level rises in this region, the expected
level of equilibrium misconduct falls. Broadly speaking, these theoretical results provide
intuition behind managers’ decisions to allow less severe levels of misconduct to take
place in the workplace – under imperfect enforcement, tolerance lowers equilibrium
misconduct.
The model can be extended in several ways. The first would be to allow for
players. It would be interesting to see how the tolerated level that induces minimum
misconduct changes as the number of contestants grows. Gilpatric (2011) finds that when
the error term, , is uniformly distributed, the equilibrium level of cheating increases as
the number of players increases. Assuming a larger population (i.e., ), an interesting
extension would allow for heterogeneity in the value contestants place on misconduct.
That is, some contestants obtain a higher benefit from engaging in misconduct relative to
other contestants who obtain a lower benefit, for any level of misconduct. When this
27

heterogeneity is unknown to the tournament organizer, setting the tolerated level that
minimizes misconduct can be problematic.18 For example, if the population mainly
consists of ‘high’ types and the tournament organizer sets the tolerated level too low, he
runs the risk of motivating contestants to choose higher levels of misconduct than they
would under zero tolerance (e.g., set such that

chosen if cheating occurs).

Similarly, if the population mainly consists of “low” types, the tournament organizer may
induce these contestants to engage in higher levels of misconduct than they would under
a lower tolerated level (e.g., for a low type is less than set by the regulator).
Consequently, the tournament organizer would have to acknowledge that, when setting
the tolerated level, he faces a distribution of ‘types’.
In a similar vein, one could model a scenario where the tournament organizer chooses
the level of tolerance but faces uncertain states of temptation (i.e., the gain from
misconduct is unknown to the organizer). Suppose the state of temptation is low but the
organizer does not know this and subsequently chooses a relatively high level of
tolerance. Then, he induces contestants to choose higher levels of misconduct than they
otherwise would. However, when the state of the world is characterized by high
temptation, the level of tolerated misconduct may be below that which would minimize
misconduct. The organizer must balance these concerns. In my model, the organizer
knows the state of the world and therefore could tailor the level of tolerance to that which
minimizes misconduct. With uncertainty, the tournament organizer would have to take

18

If heterogeneity was known to the tournament organizer, he would set a tolerated level specific to each
type of contestant.
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into account the probability distribution of different states of the world when choosing
the optimal tolerated level.
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CHAPTER 2: CLEAN TECHNOLOGY LICENSING TO
OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKETS – PRICE VS. QUANTITY
INSTRUMENTS

2.1 Introduction
The ability of a patentholder to license a technology and extract rents has long been
recognized as the motivation behind innovation investment and diffusion. In this paper, I
apply the insights from the industrial organization literature on the licensing of a costreducing innovation to the case in which potential licensees are part of a larger polluting
oligopolistic industry and are faced with either quantity or price emissions regulation. I
consider the optimal auction policy of the patentholder and determine whether a permit
system (grandfathered or auctioned) or an emissions tax yields a higher number of
licenses to be auctioned (i.e., higher level of diffusion).
Kneese and Schulze (1975) first acknowledged that such a ‘dynamic efficiency’
property ought to be taken into account when assessing the costs and benefits of different
policy mechanisms.19 The recognition that market-based instruments can indirectly
encourage investment in environmental science and technology has led to a large strand
of research aimed at ranking alternative policies based on the incentives they provide to
diffuse existing technologies (see Jaffe et al. (2004) and Requate (2005) for the most
comprehensive survey of this literature). Although providing tremendous insight into the
superiority of some instruments, the literature has generally assumed the polluting

19

Dynamic efficiency refers to the long-run effects of policy such as the incentives to invest in research,
development, and technology and in technology adoption/diffusion. This is in contrast to static efficiency
which is primarily concerned with the short-run effects of policy.
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industry to be perfectly competitive and/or that the technology is discounted enough (or
even free) so that any firm that wishes to adopt it can do so (Milliman & Prince, 1989;
Downing & White, 1986; Jung, Krutilla, & Boyd, 1996; Parry, 1998; Requate & Unold,
2003). But do the policy rankings change when the polluting industry is oligopolistic and
when the profit-maximizing behavior of the supply side (i.e., the patentholder) is taken
into account? Since several polluting industries, such as electricity generation and pulp
and paper mills, are oligopolistic (Wolfram, 1999; Borenstein, Bushnell, & Wolak, 2002;
Cho & Kim, 2007; Erbas & Abler, 2008), it is important to know if, and understand how,
such strategic interaction in the output market can affect the dynamic efficiency of
alternative instruments.
At the core of any analysis on induced innovation is the notion that regulation
changes the price of pollution (which is an input into the production process) and
subsequently firms respond by investing in cost-reducing technology.20, 21 Often, models
take as given perfect diffusion and therefore rank policies on the incentive to invest in
technology creation (e.g., research, development, and demonstration). To the extent that
better technology lowers the equilibrium permit price as diffusion occurs, a polluting
firm’s willingness to pay for the technology falls. Consequently, marginal licensing
revenues, and thus the incentive to invest, are lower under a permit system relative to a
tax (Milliman & Prince, 1989; Downing & White, 1986; Jung, Krutilla, & Boyd, 1996;

20

That changes in the price of inputs motivates firms to invest in technology is known as Hicks’s Induced
Innovation Hypothesis (Hicks, 1932).
21

Of course, the firm has other options such as reducing pollution intensive output or paying the
compliance costs.
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Parry, 1998; Requate & Unold, 2003; de Vries, 2004).22 The same intuition may be
applied when one considers the incentive to diffuse a given technology to perfectly
competitive markets - the number of licenses auctioned will be smaller under a permit
system for the same reasons investment by the innovator is lower.
However, I assume that the output market is oligopolistic and therefore apply the
main results found within the industrial organization literature on licensing of costreducing innovations to such imperfectly competitive markets. In particular, I determine
the level of diffusion of a clean technology when an outside patentholder engages in an
optimal auction policy.23 The existing industrial organization literature has broadly
modeled licensing in oligopolistic markets but has not studied issues specific to
environmental policy (Kamien, Oren, & Tauman, 1992; Katz & Shapiro, 1985; Sen &
Tauman, 2007). Technology licensing under an emissions tax can be treated just like any
licensing of cost-reducing technology since the price of the input (here, pollution) is
fixed. As firms license the technology they become relatively more efficient compared to
their unlicensed counterparts. In this regard, the auction policy under an emissions tax
can be viewed as a ‘benchmark’ case to be compared to the more complex permit
scenario. On the other hand, when the environmental policy imposed is an aggregate cap
with a tradable permits market, the supply of pollution rights is perfectly inelastic, in
contrast to the case of a tax where supply is perfectly elastic. In this case, as more

22

This assumes that the regulator is myopic or that policy is too inflexible to change in response to
technology changes.
23

It has been shown that licensing via an auction dominates a royalty or fixed fee policy when demand is
linear and the innovator is outside of the producing industry (Katz & Shapiro, 1985; Katz & Shapiro,
1986).
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licenses are issued and a larger share of the market becomes more efficient, the price of
pollution (permit price) falls. Unlicensed firms free ride off of this ‘spillover’. The lower
permit price reduces the value of additional licenses. The additional complexity that is
inherent under a cap and trade system must be taken into account by the patentholder
when he is making his decision on how many firms to license to.
Most relevant to my model is the work by Kamien et al. (1992) that defines a
‘threshold’ number of licenses required to concentrate the market. If the patentholder
auctions a number of licenses at (or above) this threshold, unlicensed firms leave the
market. That is, the patentholder can auction enough licenses so that that the market
output price falls just below the marginal costs of production for an unlicensed firm.24
Intuitively, under either policy I find that privately optimal diffusion by the
patentholder depends on the quality of the innovation. Much like Kamien et al. (1992)
and under a tax, minor innovations are licensed to all firms while major innovations are
licensed to only a few firms, creating a natural oligopoly. That is, for sufficiently large
innovations under an emissions tax, the innovator chooses to license to just enough firms
so that any remaining unlicensed firm exits the market as they cannot profitably compete
with their relatively more efficient counterparts. In contrast, I find that under a permit
policy, sufficiently small and sufficiently large innovations are licensed to all firms since
the possibility of concentration is obsolete. Just as the permit price is a function of the
number of licensed firms, it is also a function of the quality of the innovation.
Consequently, for sufficiently large innovations, the equilibrium permit price is driven

24

Realistically, the cost share attributed to environmental compliance must be large enough to induce a
firm to shut down.
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low enough (regardless of the number of firms that license the technology) that
unlicensed firms can still be profitable and are not driven from the market. Therefore,
only ‘intermediate’ values of innovation provide the innovator with the opportunity to
create a natural oligopoly. However, unlike the case of an emissions tax, even if the
innovator can concentrate the market under a permit, I find that he may choose not to.
I find that, if it is optimal for the innovator to concentrate the market under either
policy, that the number of licenses auctioned will be higher under a permit relative to an
emissions tax. Further, using numerical simulations, I show that the level of diffusion is
generally higher under cap and trade relative to an emissions tax, regardless of whether
concentration takes place. This is an important difference with the conclusions generally
drawn in models of perfect competition. In these models, the level of diffusion will be
lower under a permit policy relative to a tax. This is because, when markets are
oligopolistic and the innovator engages in an optimal auction policy, he tends to
concentrate the market. However, due to the effects of diffusion on the permit price, it is
“more difficult” for him to concentrate the market under a permit system. That is, under a
permit system, the number of licenses required to drive unlicensed firms from the market
is higher than with a tax.
I also determine the social welfare effects of licensing (i.e., the post-licensing
outcomes versus the pre-licensing outcomes) for each policy. Numerical simulations
indicate that, generally, changes in consumer surplus and producer surplus are higher
under a permit policy relative to a tax. Environmental damages, on the other hand, are
smaller under an emissions tax. This is because, as the number of clean firms in the
market rises, aggregate emissions tend to fall under the fixed tax, whereas aggregate
34

emissions remain fixed at the chosen policy level. In aggregate, the change in total social
welfare tends to be higher (albeit slightly) under a permit policy relative to a tax.
Importantly, prior to any licensing, the environmental policy is set such that the tax
and cap are equivalent (i.e., they yield an identical price of emissions and identical
aggregate emissions to each other). The significant difference between the two policies
originates from the fact that the price of emissions remains fixed under a tax regardless of
the number of licensed firms while the price of emissions changes under a cap with the
number of licensed firms. If one considers the market for pollution to be an input market
(much like a labor market) with firms making up the demand-side, an emission tax
simply translates into a perfectly elastic supply of pollution. Licensing out a costreducing innovation will shift the demand for pollution downward with the price
remaining static. In contrast, a cap translates into a perfectly inelastic supply of pollution.
Consequently, licensing a cost-reducing innovation will, again, shift the demand for
pollution downward, with the price of the input changing to reach equilibrium.

2.2 The Model
I model a game of the licensing of a clean technology by an outside innovator (i.e.,
non-producer) to a group of

oligopolistic, polluting firms. Environmental policy, either

in the form of an emissions tax or permits (grandfathered or auctioned), is established
prior to any licensing decision and remains fixed.25 The game consists of three stages

25

Assuming a static environmental policy is what drives the difference between the two policies. If the
regulator were not myopic, or if regulation were flexible, then the policy would be set such that the
regulator would account for the technology realized by each firm and the price of emissions would
ultimately be identical under either policy.
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under either policy. In the first stage, the innovator announces the number of licenses to
auction that will maximize licensing revenues. In the second stage, all firms
simultaneously submit a sealed bid for a license. In the third stage, once the auction
outcome is realized, firms strategically choose production levels to maximize profits.
Since pollution is a by-product of production, this final stage also determines permits
demanded. Therefore, under a permit policy, the third stage simultaneously solves the
output market and permit market equilibria. The game is solved backwards.
Consider an output market that consists of

firms that produce identical goods

and compete a la Cournot. They face a downward sloping demand function,
with

. Initially, all firms employ a ‘dirty’ technology so that production

generates firm-specific emissions one-for-one with output (i.e., the emissions to output
ratio for the dirty technology is normalized to 1).
An environmental authority has implemented a static policy of either an emissions tax
or an aggregate emissions cap with a tradable permits market based on the current, dirty
technology. To better compare the level of diffusion under each policy, I assume a
benchmark scenario in which the policies are equivalent to one another prior to the
licensing decision. That is, the policy is such that the permit price prior to licensing and
the emissions tax are identical. Thus, prior to the start of the game, each firm faces
marginal costs of

, where is the marginal cost of production and is the price of

emissions. The price of emissions,

represents either the constant marginal tax or the

equilibrium permit price. It is assumed that

. Note that the equilibrium permit

price under grandfathered permits is identical to that under auctioned permits. The first
stage begins with an outside innovator that currently holds a patent to a clean technology
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which can reduce a firm’s emissions to output ratio to

with

.26 Taken

as given the environmental policy, the innovator chooses a number of licenses to auction,
, where
Else, if

. Note that I restrict the number of licenses issued to be less than .
, the policy would be identical to a fixed fee policy where all firms would

be guaranteed the new technology. From Kamien et al. (1992), it is concluded that an
auction policy is preferred by the innovator to a fixed fee or royalty policy since the latter
are dominated by the former in terms of potential innovator revenues.
In the second stage, each firm takes
sealed bid,

as given and simultaneously submits their

.27 This bid represents a firm’s willingness to pay for the license.

In the final stage, all technologies are realized and firms choose production levels, taking
the price of emissions as given, to maximize own profits. 28, 29 Since pollution is a byproduct of production this stage also solves firm-level emissions (or, in the case of a
permit system, it establishes permit demand) and therefore the equilibrium permit price.
Consistent with the industrial organization literature, I treat

as a continuous variable to

better assess comparative statics.

2.3 Equilibrium Under an Emissions Tax

26

In this regard, the new technology represents one which lowers emissions at the source rather than
reducing marginal abatement costs.
27

It is assumed that coordination is not possible so that firms may not collude during the auction.

28

The assumption of perfectly competitive permit markets is typical in the existing literature and is often
rationalized on the basis that the permit market is comprised of geographically distant and smaller output
markets. Therefore, no one firm can have a significant effect on the permit price.
29
Recent attention has been given to the assumption of perfectly competitive permit markets. Most notably
is Montero (2002a; 2002b) who argues that many permit markets are in fact dominated by large players and
therefore exhibit market power.
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The environmental authority sets the emissions tax, , prior to any licensing decision
made by the innovator. As such, the tax simply creates a (higher) marginal cost faced by
all firms and the model under an emissions tax is identical to existing models for which
an innovator chooses to auction any innovation that reduces constant marginal cost to
oligopolistic firms. (See, for example, Kamien et al. (1992) or Sen and Tauman (2007).)
In this section, I simply restate, as applied to an emissions tax, the significant conclusions
from these existing models.
Foremost, it is recognized that for sufficiently large innovations, if enough firms are
auctioned the license, their cost advantage (relative to unlicensed firms) will be sufficient
to drive all unlicensed firms from the market. That is, for any , the equilibrium output
price,

, decreases as some firms become relatively more efficient. Under a tax, the

marginal cost faced by an unlicensed firm remains fixed at
the innovation is large enough, as

. Ultimately, so long as

increases, the output price will fall below this

marginal cost, making it unprofitable for unlicensed firms to remain in the market. When
the innovation is not large enough, then the relative cost advantage of licensed firms does
not drive the equilibrium output price below

.

Thus, so long as the innovation is sufficiently large, there exists a threshold level of
licenses, , which represents the minimum number of licenses required to concentrate the
market (Kamien et al. (1992), Sen and Tauman (2007)). If the innovator chooses to
license to

, then all firms remain in the market with only a portion of them

holding the license. Else, if

all unlicensed firms drop out of the market and a -

firm oligopoly is created.
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Lemma 2.1: (a) Under any fixed Pigouvian emissions tax,

the minimum

number of licenses required to concentrate the market is
order for

. (b) In

, the innovation must be sufficiently large,

where

. [See Appendix A for all proofs].

Lemma 1 provides this threshold in terms of the parameters of the model and
highlights that in order for concentration to be possible, the innovation must be large
enough. Else, if

, then all firms remain in the market regardless of how many

licenses are auctioned.
The innovator’s objective is to choose a licensing strategy, , that maximizes his own
licensing revenues,

where

is the bid received. This bid is simply the

difference in Cournot profits from having the license and not having the license. From the
existing literature on the optimal auction policy of a cost-reducing innovation to
oligopolistic firms, I have the following proposition as applied to an emissions tax:

Proposition 2.1 (emissions tax): Under any fixed Pigouvian emissions tax,
for sufficiently large innovations,

and

:

(a) the innovator’s optimal auction policy is to license to exactly
.
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firms;

(b) all unlicensed firms leave the market. All remaining firms use the clean
technology.
(c) consumer surplus is higher and producer surplus is lower relative to the
absence of licensing.

Parts (a), (b), and (c) of Proposition 2.1 follow directly from the results in Kamien et
al. (1992), Katz and Shapiro (1985; 1987), and Sen and Tauman (2007). So long as the
innovation is sufficiently large to ensure that a relative cost advantage is big enough to
drive less efficient firms from the market, the innovator will always license to the
minimum number of firms to create a natural oligopoly. Although the market is smaller,
all remaining firms now employ the clean technology. The reason why concentration is
optimal from the innovator’s viewpoint is that, once the market becomes concentrated, he
has the ability to behave much like a monopolist and can therefore extract entire industry
rents through his auction. Licensing to more firms beyond

is akin to making the

market more competitive, which lowers industry profits. Therefore, there is no incentive
to license to more than

under an emissions tax.

Regarding (c), once the policy is in place and prior to any licensing, all firms are
faced with marginal costs of

. As the innovation diffuses across the market, firms

become relatively more efficient, the equilibrium output price falls and consumers are
better off. Each firm, however, is worse off than it was before licensing took place. Any
unlicensed firm now earns zero profits as it does not produce anything. Likewise,
licensed firms earn Cournot profits but those are paid to the innovator in exchange for the
license.
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2.4 Equilibrium Under Permits
In this section I analyze the equilibrium under permits which are either auctioned by
the government or issued gratis. Unlike the emissions tax, this analysis is more complex
due to the impact of

on the permit equilibrium price. It has already been stated that as

the number of licenseholders increases under an emissions tax, the price of emissions,
remains constant at its pre-specified level. Under permits, however, the number of
licenses auctioned determines aggregate permit demand and therefore changes the price
of emissions faced by both clean and dirty firms. That is, under permits, the price of
emissions is a function of ,

The innovator, foreseeing equilibrium in the

permit market, recognizes that his licensing decision affects the permit price and takes
this influence into account when making his auction decision.
2.4.1 Production and Permit Market Equilibrium
Let a subscript l denote one of the
while a subscript

firms that has a license to the clean technology

denotes one of the

firms with the dirty technology. The

Cournot equilibrium depends on whether or not enough licenses were auctioned to
concentrate the market (Kamien, Oren, & Tauman, 1992; Sen & Tauman, 2007). As
defined by Sen and Tauman, an innovation is called " -drastic" if

is the minimum

number of licensed firms required to concentrate the market into a -firm oligopoly (i.e.,
all unlicensed firms drop out of the market). This occurs when the output price is no
larger than an unlicensed firm’s marginal costs of production,
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[2.1]

where

is, again, the equilibrium permit price as a function of the number of licenses

issued.30 Letting [2.1] hold with equality and solving for

yields the minimum number

of licenses required to concentrate the market under a permit system,

Lemma 2.2: (a) Under any aggregate emissions cap,

.

the minimum number of

licenses required to concentrate the market is
for

(b) In order

, the innovation must not be too small nor too large,
where

and

with

.

Proposition 2.2: The minimum number of licenses required to concentrate the
market under a permit system is larger than that under an emissions tax,

30

In the industrial organization literature, innovations are typically categorized as ‘drastic’ and ‘nondrastic’ without regard for the level of diffusion. Generally, a drastic innovation is one for which the license
holder can become the sole producer in the market. This is in contrast to a non-drastic innovation for which
a single license holder may become more efficient than his competitors, but not so much so that he
becomes the sole producer. In this regard, a 1-drastic innovation as it is defined in the current model is
analogous to a drastic model in the industrial organization literature, but any non-drastic innovation can be
k-drastic.
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Lemma 2.2 defines the minimum number of licenses required to concentrate the
market under a permit system,

It also restricts attention to those innovation levels

for which concentration is feasible (although not necessarily optimal from the innovator’s
standpoint). It states that, much like the case under an emissions tax, the innovation must
be sufficiently large so that the license holders’ relative cost advantage is enough to push
non-license holders out of the market. Unlike the case of an emissions tax, the innovation
must not be too large either. This is because a better quality innovation lowers the
equilibrium permit price. Therefore, significantly large innovations lower the permit price
enough for non licenseholders to remain in the market, regardless of the number of firms
that have the license.
Proposition 2.2 states that it is ‘easier’ to concentrate the market under an emissions
tax relative to a permit system. Recall that in order to drive unlicensed firms from the
market the equilibrium market price must fall below the marginal cost faced by an
unlicensed firm. This marginal cost remains fixed under an emissions tax while it falls
under a permit.31 Thus a larger number of licensed firms under a permit policy is required
to drive unlicensed firms from the market.
Then, for a given cap, , the following are the production equilibria as a function of
. The equilibrium market price and aggregate output are

31

The equilibrium market price under a permit falls faster than it does under a tax, owing to the decreasing
equilibrium permit price. However, this is not enough to make
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[2.2]

and

[2.3]

Firm level production is

[2.4]

and

[2.5]

Cournot profits and industry profits are
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[2.6]

[2.7]

and

.

Since emissions are a byproduct of output, firm-level permit demand,
permit demand,

[2.8]

, and aggregate

, are

[2.9]

[2.10]

and

[2.11]

45

The equilibrium permit price is determined by setting aggregate permit demand [2.11]
equal to the cap,

and solving for :

[2.12]

Substituting equation [2.12] for

in equations [2.2] through [2.11] yields the

production and pollution equilibria for any .
Before analyzing the auction policy, I state the following Lemma which discusses
how the equilibrium output price changes with .

Lemma 2.3: The equilibrium output price is a continuous function of

and is

decreasing in .

The import of Lemma 3 is that, even in a scenario where the equilibrium permit price is
increasing, the output price is continuously falling. That is, consider the case for which
. From [2.12], it is clear that the as
increases. Increasing

beyond

increases, the equilibrium permit price

is analogous to increasing the number of buyers

(demand) in an input market (permits). Accordingly, as aggregate permit demand shifts
up, and the supply remains static, the permit price increases. This, of course, places
upward pressure on the output price. However, Lemma 3 states that this upward pressure
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is not enough to outweigh the decrease in the market price associated with increasing the
number of sellers.
2.4.2 Bid
A firm’s bid,

is the maximum willingness to pay for the license,

[2.13]

It is simply the opportunity cost of holding a license, which is the difference in profits
earned between a license holder and an unlicensed firm.

Lemma 2.4: For

, the bid for a license under permits is decreasing in

i.e.,

Lemma 2.4 states that the payoff from owning the license falls as an additional firm
attains the license. Consider the choice of the marginal firm deciding between paying for
the license or not. Ceteris paribus, the level of output for both clean and dirty firms falls
as more firms become relatively more efficient,

and

, and this

lowers their profit. However, since a licensed firm has a higher profit than an unlicensed
firm, the latter has more to lose as

increases. Consequently, the fall in a licensed firm’s

profit is larger than the fall in an unlicensed firm’s profit, making the bid fall as
increases. Similarly, as

increases, firms are less willing to pay for the license because
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of its effect on the permit price. That is, the benefit of holding the license becomes lesser
since any unlicensed firm can still free ride off of the fall in the permit price. Therefore,
under a permit system, the bid falls with

not only because of the fall associated directly

with output but also because one of the benefits of having a license – a lower marginal
cost – is (costlessly) exploited by unlicensed firms on the permit market.
2.4.3 Auction Policy
The auction policy of the innovator is to choose
where
and then when

to maximize licensing revenues,

is defined in [2.13]. I first consider the case in which
For

the patent holder behaves as a sole

monopolist and extracts entire industry rents.

Lemma 2.5: For

, industry profits are decreasing under a permit system.

Lemma 2.5 states that once the market can become concentrated, industry profits, and
therefore innovator revenues, decrease if the innovator auctions additional licenses.
Recall that once

, the market output price equals exactly the marginal cost

faced by a dirty firm. Effectively, licensing to one more firm beyond

, adds an

additional competitor to the output and permit markets, creating two effects on industry
profits. First, ‘allowing’ one more firm to compete in the market lowers the equilibrium
output price. Second, auctioning one more license above

increases the aggregate

demand for permits and therefore the equilibrium permit price. Although this increase in
the permit price places upward pressure on the output price, the direct effect of increased
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competition on the output price is strong enough to ensure that the output price falls as
increases above

and so too does industry profits. Therefore, under a permit system,

the innovator’s problem is reduced to choosing

].

Next consider the patent holder’s decision to license to

so that unlicensed

firms do remain in the market. Again, the innovator's profits,

, are comprised of the

bids he receives

. His objective function is then

[2.14]

Unlike the case under an emissions tax, it is not necessarily true that
increasing for all levels of

is

. As such, it is possible that the solution to [2.14] is

interior and that the optimum from the innovator’s perspective is to auction a number of
licenses,

below that which would concentrate the market (i.e., a possible solution is
).

Lemma 2.6: There exists a function,

such that if
then for some
some

If

licensing revenues are decreasing for
, licensing revenues are increasing in
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.

Lemma 2.6 emphasizes that licensing revenues are not necessarily increasing for all
levels of

under permits. This is in stark contrast to the case under an emissions tax in

which licensing revenues are always increasing for all levels of

Using Lemmas

[2.5] and [2.6], I state the following proposition,

Proposition 2.3 (permits): Under any fixed aggregate cap,
for some

if

then

,

(a) the innovator’s optimal auction policy is to license to
solves

where

.

(b) all licensed and unlicensed firms remain in the market with
using the clean technology and

firms

firms using the dirty technology.

(c) consumer surplus is higher and each firm is worse off; each firm is
relatively more worse off under a grandfathered permit policy relative to an
auctioned permit policy.

Proposition 2.3 is the main result of this analysis. Importantly, parts (a) and (b) state
that under permits, it is not necessarily true that the innovator will choose to concentrate
the market even when it has the ability to do so. This is in opposition to the case under an
emissions tax in which, as stated in Proposition 2.1, it is always optimal from the
innovator’s perspective to behave like a monopolist and extract maximum industry
profits by concentrating the market at the minimum threshold. The difference stems from
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the innovator seeing through to the permit market and acknowledging that his licensing
decision changes the price of emissions, thereby changing the bid he can receive. Under
permits, an unlicensed firm is able free ride off of the fall in the permit price as the
number of licenses increases, and therefore is less willing to pay for the innovation. Thus,
much like the rationale used in the existing environmental economics literature, the
innovator attempts to keep the permit price artificially high so that the bid (and therefore
his licensing revenues) remains high. He does this by not concentrating the market,
effectively keeping aggregate permit demand high by allowing both dirty and clean firms
to remain operable.
Much like the case under an emissions tax, part (c) states that consumers are better off
relative to the ex-post environmental policy state. Since diffusion of technology has
lowered the market price, consumer welfare is now higher. Firms may be better off or
worse off under the permit system. To see, note that any firm earns profits of
where represents the firm-level number of permits handed out gratis by the
environmental authority under a grandfathered system. Note that the first term of the
Cournot profits,

, under an auctioned permit policy is identical to that under a

grandfathered permit system.32 Under an auction,

. Thus, it is clear that as

increases from zero (a ‘pre-licensing’ stage), not only does the term
does

Intuitively,

is of value to a firm that holds it. As

fall, so too
increases, the

reduction in the permit price also reduces the value of the permits held.

32

This is because, when the firm maximizes its own profit in the Cournot subgame, the term drops out.
Likewise, when the innovator is deciding on the optimal level of , the bid he expects is without the
term since they cancel each other out.
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From propositions [2.2] and [2.3] it follows that if the innovator chooses to
concentrate the market under either policy, the number of licenses auctioned will be
higher under a permit relative to a tax.

Proposition 2.4: When

the innovator will license to more firms under a

permit relative to a tax.

Proposition 2.4 states that when a polluting industry consists of imperfectly
competitive firms engaged in quantity competition, a profit-maximizing outside innovator
will license to more firms under a permit than under a tax. Most models of perfect
competition show that an innovator will artificially keep the permit price high by
restricting the number of licenses relative to a tax. When one assumes an imperfectly
competitive market and accounts for the profit-maximizing behavior of the innovator, it
is found that it is best for that innovator to concentrate the market. Since it is ‘more
difficult’ to do this under a permit policy owing to the reduction in the permit price from
increases in , it follows that the number of licenses auctioned is higher under the
permit.

2.5 Numerical Illustration
It is clear from Proposition 2.3 that the optimal license auction under the permit
depends on the parameters of the model. Therefore, I run numerical simulations to
illustrate the differential effects that each policy has on the auction policy. In particular,
my main focus is to show that, for the parameters specified, the level of diffusion under
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the permit policy is larger than the tax. Further, since determining the welfare effects for
a permit policy and a tax generally leads to ambiguous results, I also calculate the
changes in social welfare under each policy.
2.5.1 Second-best Environmental Policy
The environmental authority chooses policy prior to any innovation and this policy
remains fixed (i.e., the policymaker neither accounts for the possibility of technology
development nor changes policy once it is put in place). The regulator's sole objective is
to maximize social welfare which is additively separable into total surplus less
environmental damage when technology and diffusion are zero. For simplicity, I assume
the environmental damage function is linear,

. Then, the social regulator's

problem is

[2.15]

which yields the following first-order conditions

[2.16]

Further, I can write the firm's problem in terms of emissions with initial technology:
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[2.17]

which yields
[2.18]

The optimal tax rate is found by equating [2.16] to [2.18], and solving for :

[2.19]

Standard within the literature, the optimal tax rate is less than marginal damages due
to the production externalities associated with imperfect competition in the output
market. Likewise, the socially optimal emissions cap can be found by substituting

into

[2.18] and solving for :

[2.20]

The price of emissions under either policy is identical prior to the licensing decision.
That is, the equilibrium permit price that would prevail sans licensing is identical to the
Pigouvian emissions tax. Likewise, the equilibrium level of aggregate emissions under an
emissions tax is identical to the aggregate cap sans licensing.
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2.5.2 Specification and Outcomes
That the equilibrium of the model depends on the level of (exogenous) innovation, I
illustrate such equilibria for varying innovation types – low innovation
innovation,

, and high innovation

, medium

.

In what follows, I provide two tables (different parameters specifications) to illustrate
the importance of the condition function,

, on the outcome of the model. In

particular, Table 2 shows that for the parameters specified,

can be positive or

negative in the relevant range of innovation, indicating a scenario for which the innovator
may optimally choose to concentrate the market under a permit. In contrast, Table 3
shows that it is never optimal for the innovator to concentrate the market, even if it is
feasible, under a permit system. I briefly discuss the significance of each table.
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Table 2: Equilibrium Outcomes – Tax versus Permit (Example 1)
Cap b,

Tax,

Low

1.957

1.957

0.647

0.133

0.522

-.300

0.955

2.272

2.272

0.687

0.281

0.562

0.000

0.843

Med

0.978

0.978

1.300

0.133

1.169

-.975

2.277

1.786

1.786

1.556

0.889

1.431

0.000

2.319

High

0.559

0.559

2.264

0.133

2.139

-1.99

4.259

7.143

2.004

2.281

3.122

2.185

0.000

4.807

(a) Note that
,
,
, and
are the changes in consumer surplus, producer surplus, environmental damages, and social
welfare, respectively, from the outcomes associated with the absence of licensing.
(b)The function
as defined in Lemma 6 has
and three real roots equal to
and
Therefore, from Proposition 3, it follows that
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Table 3: Equilibrium Outcomes – Tax versus Permit (Example 2)
Cap b,

Tax,

Low

3.889

3.695

3.159

1.539

1.663

-1.042

4.242

4.412

3.957

3.240

2.411

1.763

0.000

4.174

Med

1.944

1.944

6.229

1.625

4.800

-4.500

10.925

4.167

3.715

6.061

7.508

4.586

0.000

12.094

High

1.111

1.111

11.025

1.625

9.525

-9.750

20.900

--

1.798

6.342

10.270

6.142

0.000

16.412

a. Note that
,
,
, and
are the changes in consumer surplus, producer surplus, environmental damages, and social welfare,
respectively, from the outcomes associated with the absence of licensing.
b. The condition function,
as defined in Lemma 6 has
and one real root equal to
. Therefore, from
Proposition 3, it follows that if
.
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Table 2 illustrates the equilibrium outcomes when I assign the following parameters
to the model:

and

. Using equations [19] and [20],, it

follows that the environmental authority will set the tax rate equal to
pollution unit. The associated aggregate emissions cap is then
parameters are specified as
rate is

and

and the equivalent cap being

per

. In Table 3 the
. Then, the emissions tax

.

Consider the tax policy in Table 2 first. Looking at the columns under the tax, first
note that concentration is feasible so long as the innovation is sufficiently large,
. As is expected, the innovator always chooses to concentrate the market (i.e.,
for each level of innovation shown). Relative to what would occur had no
licensing taken place, consumer surplus is higher as a result of the lower market price.
Although not presented in the table, each firm is (individually) worse off than it were
before, but total producer surplus (as measured as industry profits) is higher. Owing to
environmental policy placing a fixed price on pollution, as more clean firms in the market
imply lower aggregate emissions (and therefore lower environmental damages). Taking
all effects as a whole, however, licensing increases social welfare for all levels of
innovation.33
Next, focusing on the outcomes under the permit system, note that, following Lemma
2.2, concentration is feasible when the innovation is no smaller than
than

and no larger

. Again, that the innovation must not be too large follows from the effect of the

33

Note that, consistent with the existing literature, tax revenues are omitted from the social welfare
function. It is assumed that these payments represent a lump-sum transfer from firms to the government.
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innovation on the permit price. Much like the fact that increasing

lowers the permit

price, so too does a high quality innovation (even if one firm were licensed the
technology). The table illustrates Proposition 2.3 nicely. Recall that Proposition 2.3 states
that there exists a condition function,
innovator will choose

, which, if non-negative implies that the

and only clean firms remain in the market. Else, he chooses

, and both types of firms remain in the market. (Refer to Figure 6 in
Appendix B for a graphical illustration of this). The numerical example shows that when
concentration is feasible, the innovator will choose to forego concentrating the market
when the innovation is sufficiently high (i.e.

). Consider the following. It

is not by the innovator’s choice that concentration is not possible when the innovation is
sufficiently large (i.e., when

). The relative cost advantage of any licensee is just

not enough to drive non-licensees out of the market since the latter free-ride off of the
reduction in the permit price from large innovations. Much in the same light, when the
innovation is large (but not too large so that the concentration is possible), the innovator
can earn more by keeping the permit price artificially high by not concentrating the
market. Much like the case under an emissions tax, consumer surplus, producer surplus
and social welfare are all higher relative to the absence of licensing. Much of the same
story can be told under a different parameter specification, as observed in Table 3.
However, the condition function here is such that it is always negative for the relevant
range of innovation, and as such, the innovator will never choose to concentrate the
market.
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In general, the tables show how, when the innovator chooses to concentrate the
market, he does so at a higher level under a permit policy relative to a tax. Further, the
changes in consumer surplus, producer surplus and social welfare are higher (albeit
slightly) under the permit policy.
To make a comparison amongst the policy instruments, I focus on Table 2 and
corresponding Figures 3, 4, and 5. The main point of the figures is to illustrate the
innovator’s maximization problem (licensing revenues as a function of
social welfare changes with

and to see how

Figure 3 provides graphical comparisons of the

equilibrium outcomes that occur under an emissions tax (the right column) and a permit
system (the left column) for the low innovation. Figures 4 and 5 provide the same
illustrations but for the medium quality innovation and the high quality innovation,
respectively. Note that, as read throughout this paper functions of

, are piecewise

functions. As such, readers should focus on the solid black lines in each of the subsequent
figures. Further, the threshold

and the innovator’s chosen

, are the vertical dashed

line and vertical dotted line, respectively. For most parameter specifications, the licensing
revenue function and the change in social welfare function as depicted in the figures
below are fairly typical. As is shown, the optimal

and

under either policy coincide.

The only difference is when the innovation is so drastic (
chooses not to concentrate the market under a permit system.
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, that the innovator

Permit

Tax

Figure 3: Equilibrium Outcomes – Tax versus Permit with Low Innovation
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Permit

Tax

Figure 4: Equilibrium Outcomes – Tax versus Permit with Medium Innovation
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Permit

Tax

Figure 5: Equilibrium Outcomes – Tax versus Permit with High Innovation
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2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I have developed a theoretical model that incorporates both oligopolistic
behavior in the output market and an outside innovator’s licensing decision with the hope
of assessing whether or not a permit system leads to a higher or lower rate of diffusion
relative to an emissions tax. I found that (i) there exists a range of innovations under
either policy for which it is always in the best interest of the innovator to concentrate the
market and (ii) at least in this range of innovations, the level of diffusion is higher under a
permit policy relative to a tax. Furthermore, consistent with the existing literature, the
number of licenses auctioned is inversely related to the quality of the innovation.
Numerical simulations provide support that the number of licenses auctioned is higher
under the permit policy. Depending on the parameters specified, the change in social
welfare may be higher or lower for either policy. Although the change in producer
surplus and the consumer surplus tend to be higher under the permit policy,
environmental damages are certainly lower under an emissions tax.
There are several limitations. The model largely represents a polluting industry in
which a firm’s environmental compliance costs are a major proportion of its total costs.
Further, any differences in the optimal auction under either environmental policy is
driven by the differences in the price of emissions. Here, as the number of licensees
increases, it creates a ‘wedge’ between the tax and the permit price, which effectively
differentiates the optimal auction under the permit policy relative to the tax. Lastly, it is
assumed that each firm has market power in the product market but only constitutes a
small portion (or is geographically dispersed enough) to have no affect on permit price.
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A natural extension would allow these firms to have market power in both the permit and
output markets (see Montero (2002a; 2002b) for a discussion of this).
However, what I consider most important from the findings is that it is crucial that
models that prescribe environmental policy ought to take into account the supply side of
technology and account for varying market structures. Although the current study is not
meant to prescribe policy, it does provide insight into these two important issues. First,
by endogenizing the licensing decision of the technology supplier it was shown that type
of environmental policy imposed can have differential effects on the level of technology
diffusion. Second, modeling the regulated market as an oligopoly, one gets away from
using the idealized concept of perfect competition and allows more realistic, strategic
behavior to take place.
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CHAPTER 3: A MODEL OF ENTRY WITH CLEAN TECHNOLOGY
LICENSING

3.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2, I modeled the innovator’s optimal licensing decision to a fixed number,
, of potential buyers. I found that, under an emissions tax, it is always optimal for the
innovator to concentrate the market. In contrast, dependent on the level of innovation, the
innovator may or may not choose to concentrate the market under a permit system;
indicating that for at least some types of innovation, ‘diffusion’ of a clean technology
may be higher under a permit than it is under a tax when the polluting industry is
oligopolistic. As an extension to the model developed in Chapter 2, this chapter aims to
determine the innovator’s optimal licensing decision when free entry exists. That is, when
making his decision, the innovator must now account for the fact that there are a
potentially limitless number of ‘dirty’ or ‘non-licensed’ firms that will compete in the
market. Is it the case that the innovator will auction a number of licenses such that the
only firms that enter are those with the license or will is the auction policy such that both
types of firms enter? How does the equilibria compare under a permit versus a tax?
Therefore, in this chapter, I determine the free-entry equilibrium that exists under a
permit policy and a tax and endogenize the auction policy of the innovator. An important
result is that, under an auction policy, firms with different ‘types’ of technologies may
both exist in equilibrium. The existing literature that examines Cournot entry/exit models
in which technology types are exogenously given conclude that a firm that is relatively
more efficient will prevail in equilibrium (Ohkawa, Makoto, Nakanishi, & Kazuharu,
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2005). In the present model, it is found when a cost-reducing innovation is auctioned
potential licensees bid up the price of a license to a point where their average total cost
of production is equal to that of the non-licensee, and the price in the market.
Consequently, an outcome in which heterogeneous firms exists in equilibrium is a
possibility. Furthermore, it is found that this model produces results analogous to those
when the number of total firms is exogenous (‘fixed

model’). Under an emissions tax,

the innovator chooses to auction just enough licenses so that non-licensees do not have an
incentive to enter. Under a permit, he licenses to no more than an analogous threshold,
and possibly less. When he licenses to a sufficiently small number of firms, both types
exist in equilibrium.

3.2 The Model
Consider a homogenous good, free-entry oligopoly where the production of the good
creates costly emissions which are regulated by an environmental authority through an
emissions tax, , or a permit policy with aggregate cap,
with

Market demand is given by

and firms compete a la Cournot.

Let an outside innovator own a patent over a clean emissions technology, which
reduces the rate of firm-level emissions attributed to final goods production. Free entry
by a potentially limitless number of dirty entrants (“non-licensees”),
while the number of clean entrants (“licensees”),

is possible,

is fixed by the innovator through an

auction policy.
Therefore, a firm will enter as a licensee by obtaining a license in the auction and will
subsequently face marginal costs of

, with
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representing the

innovation. Else, it may enter as a non-licensee and face marginal costs of
Importantly, the price of emissions,

.

depends on the environmental policy. Under a

fixed emissions tax, the price is independent of the number of firms that enter the market
and is therefore fixed at . Under a permit policy, the price is the equilibrium permit price
and is therefore dependent on the number of firms that enter,

. Both firms

face identical fixed production costs, .
The timing of the game is as follows. First, the innovator announces the number of
licenses,

to be auctioned through a first-price sealed-bid auction. Second, once

announced, each potential entrant simultaneously offers its bid with the

is

highest bidders

winning. Because all potential entrants are identical prior to the auction, they will submit
identical bids and ultimately a random tie breaking process determines which firms
obtain the license. Only those entrants that win a license pay the bid. A potential entrant
that does not obtain a license may enter as a non-licensee. Finally, once all technologies
are realized, production (and pollution) takes place. The game is solved backwards. Note
that I treat

and

as continuous for simplicity and to identify the zero profit

equilibrium of the entry process.

3.3 Production/Pollution Equilibria
Once all technologies are realized, the equilibrium production output under either
policy for each type of firm is a function of the number of firms with the license and the
number of non-licensees:
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[3.1]

and

[3.2]

where again, the price of emissions,

depends on the environmental policy. In particular,

[3.3]

Then, firm-level Cournot profit for each type is

[3.4]

and

[3.5]
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3.4 Entry Equilibrium
Since

is fixed by the innovator, the free-entry equilibrium is determined by the

zero-profit condition of a non-licensee.34 It states that an operating non-licensee is
earning non-negative profits and that the entry of an additional non-licensee would yield
to it negative profits. This entry/exit condition is given by [EC.1],

[EC.1]

Substituting into

, equations [3.2], [3.3], and [3.5], and solving for

identifies the free entry equilibrium number of non-licensees as a function of

under

each policy

[3.6]

and

34

In a recent paper by Götz (2005), the author acknowledges that when two types of firms are potential
entrants into the market, the entry conditions should be complemented with ‘no-switching’ conditions.
These conditions state that a firm-type, once it has entered the market, does not have an incentive to switch
technologies. In the present model, non-licensees cannot switch since they have no access to the innovation
and licensees do not switch since, in equilibrium, they would earn lower profits from doing so under an
auction policy. Thus, the no-switching conditions do not apply in the auction case and are therefore
omitted.
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[3.7]

Equation [3.6] yields all combinations of

and

that yield the non-licensee zero-

profit under an emissions tax. Likewise, [3.7] yields those combinations under a permit
policy.35 Figure 6 illustrates the zero-profit conditions under each policy (i.e., equations
[3.6] and [3.7]). Coordinates that lie below the zero-profit line indicate positive profit
while coordinates that lie above the zero profit-line indicate negative profit.36
For a given , an entry decision by a non-licensee is represented as a movement
upward that is parallel to the vertical axis. Let

with

denote the horizontal

intercepts under a tax and permit policy, respectively. Then, under each policy, for any
non-licensees will enter until they ‘reach’ the zero-profit line. Any further entry is
met with negative profits. For any

, non-licensees will never enter as it is not

profitable to do so. Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 state the potential entry equilibria for each
policy.37

35

That is, equation [3.7] takes into account the equilibrium permit price.

36

That the slopes of each zero-profit condition are different stem from the effects of and
on the
equilibrium permit price,
. The reduction in
that is required to maintain zero-profit as
increases under the permit is less than the reduction required under a tax. Specifically, the zero-profit
condition under a tax is decreasing at a constant rate whereas, under the permit, it decreases at an
increasing rate,

.

37

This is considered a “potential” equilibrium since the true equilibrium depends on the optimal decision
making of the innovator.
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Figure 6: Non-licensee's Zero-profit Condition - Tax versus Permit

Lemma 3.1 (tax): If

, both types of firms may exist in

equilibrium under an auction policy where the number of non-licensees that enter
in equilibrium is given by

Else, if

, then a

symmetric equilibrium exists in which only licensees enter. [See Appendix A for
all proofs.]

Lemma 3.2 (permit): Under a permit, if

,

then both types of firms may exist in equilibrium under an auction policy where
the number of non-licensees that enter in equilibrium is given by
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Else, if

, then a symmetric equilibrium exists in which only licensees
enter.

Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 state that there exist two possible equilibrium, dependent on the
auction policy of the innovator. Under either policy, when the number of licenses
auctioned is sufficiently small, non-licensees enter the market. On the other hand, if the
number of licenses auctioned is large enough, entry by even a single non-licensee is
effectively deterred. This is because, as

increases, the market price that would prevail

eventually falls below the average total cost of the non-licensee. That

is bounded from

above to ensure a symmetric equilibrium implies that a licensee would earn negative
profits if the innovator were to license to too many firms. Figure 7 illustrates Lemmas 3.1
and 3.2.
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asymmetric
equilibria possible

asymmetric
equilibria possible

symmetric
equilibria possible

Figure 7: Entry Equilibria as dependent on

symmetric
equilibria possible

– Tax versus Permit

3.5 The Bid
A potential entrant’s maximum willingness to pay is equal to the maximum value of
the innovation. Therefore, the bid offered is the difference between the Cournot profits
earned from owning a license relative to entering as a dirty firm. Under either policy, the
bid can be expressed as

[3.8]

Equation [3.8] states that a potential entrant is willing to bid up to an amount such that it
were to earn the profits of a non-licensee (i.e., zero). This states that each potential
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entrant submits a bid such that its own average total costs of production are equal to the
price in the market.38

Proposition 3.1: When

for

a potential entrant offers a bid

such that the average total costs of each type of firm are identical to the market
price. When

the bid offered is such that the average total cost of the

licensee is equal to the market price.

Proposition 3.1 states that, under an auction, both types of firms end up with zero profit
in equilibrium. The bid that is ultimately paid by the licensee reduces its profits to the
same profits that a non-licensee would earn, regardless of the

chosen by the innovator.

3.6 Innovator’s Problem
The innovator’s problem is to maximize licensing revenues with respect to . His
licensing revenues,
itself,

are comprised of the

bids received multiplied by the bid

, which can be written as

[3.9]

38

As stated earlier, since all firms are ex-ante symmetric, they each bid an identical value equal to [3.8].
The firms that obtain the license are determined by a random tie breaking process.
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In what follows, I differentiate between the innovator’s problem under an emissions tax
and the permit policy.
3.6.1 Emissions Tax
Under an emissions tax, the innovator’s licensing revenue function,

, can be

written as

[3.10]

It is clear from [3.10] that the licensing revenue function is a linear function of
and is decreasing for

. Consequently, the maximum occurs at

when
.39

Proposition 3.2: In a free entry equilibrium in which the number of potential nonlicensees is infinite, an innovator will optimally auction
The equilibrium number of firms in the market will be
3.6.2 Permit Policy
Under a permit policy, licensing revenues can be written as

39
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licenses.

[3.11]

It is clear from [3.11] that licensing revenues are decreasing in

when

Therefore, the number of licenses auctioned will be no more than

.

. Whereas the

licensing revenue function under an emissions tax for the asymmetric equilibrium was
decreasing in , it may or may not decrease under the permit policy. Evaluating the
marginal licensing revenue function for

at

, gives insight into the optimal

decision of the innovator,

[3.12]

Thus, it is optimal for the innovator to choose
is optimal to choose

if [3.12] is negative. Else, it

. Some conclusions about the effects of the permit

market can be drawn from the equation. First, note that the innovator is more likely to
choose

when either the emissions cap is large or the innovation is

sufficiently drastic. Ceteris paribus, increasing the cap or the innovation would lower the
permit price in the market. It has already been discussed that one strategy for the
innovator is to keep the permit price artificially high as to negate any loss in value of
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holding a license. That is, recall that any type of firm that operates garners the rewards of
a falling permit price, whether they have the innovation or not. Consequently, this
reduction in the permit price lowers the value of the innovation and the bid received falls.
The innovator can mitigate some of this by inducing non-licensees to enter the market
and to bid up the price of a permit.

3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, a model of free entry/exit under an auction policy was presented. In it,
the licensee set a fixed number of licenses of a clean technology to be auctioned to a
potentially infinite pool of market entrants. The results are analogous to those in Chapter
2 in which the number of firms in the market is fixed.
Under an emissions tax, an equilibrium exists in which the innovator licenses to just
enough firms to make entry by non-licensees unprofitable. As is the case under the fixed
n model, each licensee yields positive profits in production, the value of which is
awarded to the innovator in the form of a bid. Further, recall that in the fixed n model
under an emissions tax, that the innovation needed to be sufficiently drastic in order for
the innovator to be able to concentrate the market. Else, the relative cost advantage of a
licensee is not enough to drive non-licensees from the market. Thus, it was either the case
that for sufficiently small innovations, complete diffusion occurred or, for sufficiently
large innovations, the innovator’s auction policy was such that it induced exit. In the end,
all firms that remained in the market were licensees. Quite similarly, in the free entry
model, complete diffusion occurs for any innovation level. The difference between the
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two is that, in the entry model, the innovator deters entry by non-licensees whereas he
induced exit by non-licensees in the fixed n model.
Under an emissions cap, the innovator still faces the same ‘dilemma’ as he would
under the fixed n model. Foreseeing equilibrium in the permit market, the innovator must
consider the effects his licensing decision has on the permit price. In this model, a
potentially limitless number of non-licensees can enter the market. This has two effects –
it drives the profits earned by any licensee firm down due to more competition. On the
other hand, more non-licensees implies a higher permit price. This higher permit price
increases the value of the license. As was concluded for the case of the permit, it is not
unambiguous whether the innovator will decide to choose
enter and operate, or

so that only licensees will

so that both types operate.

In relative terms, if the innovator decides to ‘deter’ entry by non-licensees under
either policy, than he would license to more firms under the permit. This is strictly due to
the effect of the permit price on a non-licensee’s profits. Recall that

is determined

where the profits for a non-licensee are no longer positive. As k increases, a nonlicensee’s profits fall less than they would under an equivalent tax.
Comparing to the fixed

model, it is the case that the number of firms that end up in

equilibrium under the free entry model will be lower. This is due to the fixed costs
incurred by both types of firms. As was shown, as the fixed cost approaches zero, the
optimal auction policy under the fixed

model and the entry game are identical.
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APPENDIX A: PROOFS
Proposition 1.1
(a) Conditions for : It is a dominant strategy for player to choose when the
expected payoffs from choosing are larger than choosing malfeasance, regardless of
what action
chooses. Therefore, if – chooses the tolerated level, the expected
payoff of player choosing must be greater than of player choosing :
. This corresponds to condition
.
Likewise, if – were to engage in malfeasance, then the expected payoff of player
choosing must be greater than of player choosing :
.
This corresponds to
. Since
, it follows that that the constraint
is more restrictive.
The minimum level of tolerance required to induce the symmetric tolerance
equilibrium, , is implicitly defined in
. To ensure that
is the minimum tolerated level that motivates the symmetric tolerance equilibrium,
note that an epsilon increase in would decrease the right hand side of the inequality
by

, where it is

calculated directly from the first-order conditions in [1.6] that

, making

the constraint more likely to hold.
(b) Conditions for : It is a dominant strategy for player engage in malfeasance
when the expected payoffs are larger than choosing the tolerated level, regardless of
what action
chooses. Therefore, if – chooses the tolerated level, the expected
payoff of player choosing must be greater than player choosing :
. This corresponds to condition
. Likewise, if –
were to engage in malfeasance, then the expected payoff of player choosing must
be greater than player choosing :
. This corresponds to
. Since
, it follows that that
the constraint
is more restrictive. The
maximum level of tolerance required to induce the symmetric malfeasance
equilibrium, , is implicitly defined in
. To
ensure that is the maximum tolerated level that motivates the symmetric
malfeasance equilibrium, note that an epsilon increase in would decrease the right
hand side of the inequality by
, where it is calculated
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directly from the first-order conditions in [1.6] that

, making the

constraint less likely to hold.
(c) It follows from (a) and (b) that

. Let

and

established that solves

. It has been
and solves

. The left-hand side of the first condition is larger than
the left-hand side of the second condition, which implies that
which is never true when

To see, suppose

,

, then the left hand side of

the inequality would be less than one and, since
which means the right-hand side of the inequality would be greater
than one. Therefore, if

, then

, which contradicts the

conditions defined by the tolerance threshold levels. Now suppose

, then the

left-hand side of the inequality would be greater than one, and
since
.
Proposition 1.2
Suppose
so that the equilibrium is . Now suppose the tournament organizer
sets tolerance slightly below so that
. Is it still a best response for player
to choose ? Ceteris paribus, a deviation from to reduces the probability of
ranking first from
to
but in turn reduces the
probability of getting detected if audited from
to . In turn, player could earn
rather than
, a difference of

. Since

, it is a best response for player to choose . Similarly, is it a best
response for player – to continue to engage in malfeasance given that will choose
? Given that player chooses , player – she will re-optimize and choose if she
decides to engage in malfeasance. Therefore, it is a best response for player – to also
choose the tolerated level if the expected payoffs are larger than the expected payoffs
from choosing ,
which simplifies to
which is true when
. Therefore, there exists
that induces the symmetric tolerance equilibrium, so long as
.
86

Lemma 1.1
The proof proceeds in several steps.
(a) Recall that conditions
and
simultaneously define
and . Let
represent the mixing strategy and
represent the first-order
conditions, where
and
:

Totally differentiating and putting in matrix form (where the inner arguments are
suppressed) yields

where
i.
ii.
, where

and where
from the first-order conditions

in

, yields

iii.
iv.
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v.
, where

and where

yields
vi.

, where

so that

Let the determinant of the first matrix be

. It is clear from (i)

through (vi) that the ranking of the misconduct levels determines the sign of
,
(b) Proof that
When

, and

.

and

when

then,

,

, and

see, from the first-order conditions in [1.6], it is true

and by the

concavity of the objective function, it follows that
It follows that

. To

when

.

. Using the same logic, it is true that from

the first-order conditions in [1.5] ,

, and the concavity of the

objective function, it follows that

when

Then,
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.

with the determinant of the matrix being negative,

.

Using Cramer’s Rule, one obtains

and

(c) Proof that
When

and

when

, then

and

conditions in [1.6], it is true that

.From the first-order
and by the concavity of the

objective function, it follows that

when

. It follows that

. Using the same logic, it is true that from the first-order
conditions in [1.5]

and the concavity of the objective

function, it follows that

when

Then,
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.

with the determinant of the matrix being negative

.

Using Cramer’s Rule, it follows that

The proof of the sign of

deserves more attention. Suppose

dividing each side by the denominator,

Recall that

Substituting this into the condition yields

Upon rearrangement,
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. Then,

Since

and
, it follows that
. This makes

the term in the parentheses on the left-hand side non-positive, making the left-hand
side positive. Since the right-hand side is negative, the condition does not hold and
.
Lemma 2.1
(a) The market becomes concentrated once the equilibrium output price falls below
the marginal cost of an unlicensed firm, where the price under an emissions tax is
given by

when all firms remain in

the market. Setting this equal to

and solving for

yields

. That

is the minimum number of licenses needed to concentrate the market requires
that the equilibrium output price continues to decrease (or at least not increase) as
increases beyond
The equilibrium output price becomes
once the market becomes concentrated. Taking the
derivative with respect to

yields

.

(b) All that is required is that

. Solving for

Proposition 2.1 (emissions tax)
Proof follows directly from Kamien et al. (1992)
Lemma 2.2
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yields

(a) It is sufficient to show that for

, the equilibrium output price remains at

or below the marginal cost of a non-licensee,

. Taking

the derivative of the permit price [2.12] with respect to
the permit price is increasing

for

shows that

. Thus, for the inequality

to hold, it is suffice to show that

is decreasing in ,

. Taking the derivative of the output price with respect to

for

yields

Therefore, the permit price must not rise too much,
for

. Plugging in

, it follows that

so long as
. Upon further inspection, it is clear that the right-hand

side of the inequality is identical to aggregate emissions demanded,

. Since it

has already been established that

increases

beyond

,

, it follows that as

.

(b) To determine the range of innovations that support the existence of
note that for

requires that

the following condition holds,
convex (concave upward) function of

. Likewise, for

requires that
which is a

whose vertex is non-positive at

Setting

and solving for the solutions for

the range of innovation levels for which

yields

:
Since
, the more restrictive range of innovations

for which

becomes
.

Proposition 2.2
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Recall that

and

. Then, for

,

requires that the innovation be sufficiently large:

The right-hand side is decreasing in . As such, if the condition holds when is at its
maximum, it holds for any below it. Since, by assumption of the model, the
environmental authority’s objective is lower aggregate emissions, the maximum the
cap would be is at the current aggregate pollution level,

. Therefore,

so long as

The right-hand side is clearly less than

since the second term on the right-hand

side is less than one. Thus, the condition certainly holds if

. Note that, from

Lemma 2.2, the relevant range of innovation levels is such that
where

. Then, it is suffice to show that
, which upon rearrangement becomes

always true. Therefore, it follows that

, which is

.

Lemma 2.3
Plugging in the equilibrium permit price [2.12] into the equilibrium output price [2.2]
for

,

. Taking the derivative with respect to

yields

Thus,

when the numerator is non-positive. Define the numerator as
. Note
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that

and that
.Therefore, the maximum that

show that if

can be is at

, then

follows that

. Then, it is suffice to
. Plugging in for

so long as

it

.

Lemma 2.4
The bid is the licensee’s Cournot profits less a non-licensee’s Cournot profits,
. Rewriting in terms of output and noting that
, it follows that

Taking the derivative with respect to

yields

Lemma 2.5
From Lemma 2.2 it has already been established that the output price falls as
increases

. Following Sen and Tauman (2007), define industry profits as a

function of the output price,
the derivative with respect to yields

. Taking

which is less than zero if

. Upon rearrangement and

noting that
, it follows that for
requires
that
. Recall that by assumption of the model, the quality of the innovation is
such that at least one firm is licensed the technology.
Lemma 2.6
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The proof proceeds in several steps. First, I define the marginal licensing revenue
function under a permit for
If

as

. Then, I evaluate this function at

, then it is the case that

is the case that

. Else, if

.
, it

.

The marginal licensing revenue evaluated at

is

Where

The sign of

will be the sign of

in question. To see, first note that

the denominator is positive. That is, the denominator is positive if the following
condition holds:

The left-hand side negative. To see, note that for the permit price to be non-negative,
it is such that
. Since
for

, it must be that
, the denominator is positive if

which can be written as
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. Then, solving

which is always true since the right-hand side is greater than one, and by assumption
of the model, the innovation is always less than one. Therefore, the sign of
is the sign of the term

in the numerator. Depending on the parameters

specified, the function can be either positive or negative.
Proposition 2.3
Parts (a) and (b) follow directly from Lemma 6. The first part of (c) follows from the
reduction in the market price. To see the effect on a licensee’s profit, observe its
profit function under a grandfathered permit,
and under an auctioned permit,
,

A licensee always makes more profit under a grandfathered permit than an auction in
equilibrium. To see that a licensee earns less profit post-licensing under either type of
permit policy, note that by construction of the demand and cost functions, the
Cournot profit for any firm is simply the square of its output. It has already been
established that output (and therefore profit) is decreasing in . As such, a licensee is
worse off, under either permit policy, relative to the absence of licensing. Further, the
profit loss under a grandfathered permit is larger than under an auction since the value
of a permit handed out gratis is now smaller. The same logic can be applied to the
profit change of a non-licensee.
Proposition 2.4
Follows from Proposition 2.2 and Lemma 2.6.
Lemma 3.1
Define

and

. Then, under an

auction policy, if
for
an asymmetric equilibrium is possible in
which both types of firms may exist. Else, if
, a symmetric equilibrium is
possible in which only licensees may exist. [See Appendix A for all proofs.]
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Consider initially the possible equilibria under an emissions tax. Then, the proof
proceeds in several steps. I first show that an asymmetric equilibria is possible in
which both types of firms exist so long as

. Then, I show that

the symmetric equilibria in which only licensees exist is a possible outcome when

The zero-profit condition, [EC.1], states that the equilibrium number of non-licensees
that can exist in equilibrium as a function of is given in [3.6]

[3.6]

Therefore, only combinations of and
easy to verify that as increases,
. Eventually,

that solve [3.6] are possible equilibria. It is
falls in order to maintain equilibrium,
approaches zero which is simply the

horizontal intercept of [3.6]. It represents the fact that for sufficiently large , it is
never profitable for (even an epsilon) non-licensee to enter the market.
Next, I show the symmetric equilibrium. It has already been established that if
, then only licensees will exist. To see that
the licensee to make positive profit requires that
equation [3.3], it follows that

note that for a
. Substituting in

for the licensee to make positive

profit. Any greater than this and the Cournot production profits,
enough to outweigh the production fixed cost.

is not

Lemma 3.2
The zero-profit condition, [EC.1], states that the equilibrium number of non-licensees
that can exist in equilibrium as a function of is given in [3.7]

[3.7]

Therefore, only combinations of and
that solve [3.7] are possible equilibria
under the permit. It is easy to verify that as increases,
falls in order to
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maintain equilibrium,

. Eventually,

approaches zero which is simply the horizontal intercept of [3.7]. It represents the fact
that for sufficiently large , it is never profitable for (even an epsilon) non-licensee to
enter the market.
Next, I show the symmetric equilibrium. It has already been established that if
, then only licensees will exist. To see that
licensee to make positive profit requires that
equation [3.3], it follows that

note that for a the
. Substituting in

for the licensee to make positive profit.

Any greater than this and the Cournot production profits,
to outweigh the production fixed cost.

is not enough

Proposition 3.1
A potential entrant offers its maximum willingness to pay for the license, which is the
difference in the Cournot profits earned by a licensee and a non-licensee. When
, the bid paid is
as the non-licensee,

and each licensee will earn the same
.

The following is true for any price of emissions. To see that in the asymmetric
equilibrium the bid is such that the average total costs of each firm are identical and
equal to the market price note that (i) a non-licensee produces
and faces average
total costs of
, (ii) by the entry condition, the market price is equal to
, and (iii) the bid offered by the licensee is equal to
. Then,
the average total cost of a licensee is

For the average costs of the two types of firms to be identical requires that
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In the symmetric equilibrium each -licensee offers a bid equal to the Cournot profit it
could earn as a licensee,
, earning end profits
of
. Therefore, the bid offered is such that Cournot profits
are zero, which is analogous to saying that the average total cost of production is
equal to the market price.

Proposition 3.2
That
follows directly from [3.10] and the discussion that proceeds it.
Refer to proof of Proposition 3.1 to see that the price in the market is equal to the
average total costs
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APPENDIX B: SUPPLEMENTARY FIGURES

Concentration feasible

Figure 8: An Illustration of Proposition 2.3 (Example 1)
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